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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2473 
LILLIAN S'l'UBBS, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
FlRANCEiS COWDEN, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION }.,,OR "WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable t!ustices of the. Sruvreme Coi1,rt of Appeals 
· of Virginfo: 
Your petitioner, the plaintiff in t.he lower court, respect-
fully showeth unto your Honors that she is a.g-grieved 1by a 
judgment entered on the 1st day of February, 1941, by the 
Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
in favor of Frances Cowden, the defendant in the lower court. 
In the original proceedings, there were two trials. In the 
first trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the 
sum of Five Thousan<l ($5,000.00) Dollars. On the 2nd day 
of March, 1938, the said Court of Law and Chancery, on 
motion of the defendant, set aside the verdict and awanled 
a new trial, to which }1ction plaintiff duly excepted. The 
hearing- of the new trial WH8 set in said Court on the 1st day 
of February, 1941, at which trial, t]1e plaintiff offered no 
evidence, and judgment WHS entered in favor of the defend-
ant, as aforesaid, to which judgment plaintiff duly excepted. 
The parties will be hereinafter referred to in the re-
2* spect.ive *positiom, tlicy occupied in the trial court. 
I 
I 
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I 
,F'.ACTS:, 
This is an action for damages in the sum of Five Thousand 
($5,000.00) Dollars, brought by a notice of motion filed by 
the plaintiff ag·ainst the defendant for insulting words. The 
specific insulting· words alleged to have been spoken by the 
defendant of and concerning the plaintiff are as follows: 
"She is a whore and a common reprobate, and worse than 
the people on East Main Street''. Both of the parties arc 
]1ousewives and were, at the time the alleged insulting words 
were used, neighbors. 
The evidence to substantiate plaintiff's allegations was 
presented by Edward Phelps, who testified that the defend-
ant used said language concerning the plaintiff in a conver-
sation which she bad with him on October 18, l937 (R., pp. 
5 & 6). 
The plaintiff's husband, J. B. Stubbs, testified that the 
defendant called him over the telephone and impugned plain-
tiff's character and reputation and advised him to have his 
telephone lines tapped in order that he might hear certain 
conversations between plaintiff and other men and indicated 
to the witness that she had been listening in on telephone 
conversations of the plaintiff. Mr. Stubbs further testified 
that someone had tapped his telephone wires and that he and 
his wife were so molested by telephone calls that he had to 
get the telephone company to put in a new telephone with a 
secret number; that defendant accused his wife of being inti-
mate with her husband and other men and advised him 
that his wife's conduct was g·enerally known in the 
3* *neighborhood. He further stated that bcf ore this agita-
tion was started by the defendant, he and his wife were 
very happy together, but as a result, she had become hysteri-
cal and had been humiliated and harassed to a cleg·ree that 
was unbearable. 
Tbe plaintiff testified that the defendant had frequently 
called her over the telephone and asked if ,John Cowden, the 
defendant's husband, were there, and falsely accused her of 
being· intimate with the defendant's husband; that the de~ 
fenclant called her over the telephone on September 13, 1937, 
and used substantially the insulting language towards her 
that she subsequently used in lier conversation with Mr. 
Phelps, and that on that occasion, defendant called her "a 
red-headed English son-of-a-bitch". She testified further 
that defendant. instituted a suit for divorce upon the ground 
of adultery against her lmsband, J olm Cowden, in which 
suit, she learned, she had been named as co-respondent by 
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the defendant; that Mr. Cowden promised her he would con-
test this suit, but failed to do so and a divorce was g·ranted 
to the defendant after an ex parte hearing. She specifically 
denied that she ever liad any improper relations with de-
fendant's husband or that she had ever sent him anv letters 
or notes of any kind or that she had given him he~ photo-
graph or a lock of her hair. 
Both the plaintiff and defendant introduced a number of 
witnesses who testified to the good character and reputation 
of each of them. 
For her defense, the defendant denied that she used the 
insulting language alleged in the notice of motion and 
4* denied using *insulting language towards the plaintiff 
over the telephone. She testified that on one occasion 
she saw her husband come out of the Stubbs' home; that 
she had heard rumors about her husband and the plaintiff 
and having seen him come out of the Stubbs' home, it looked 
suspicious to her; that ~be started investigating and found 
tha.t Cowden had been visiting the plaintiff in her husband's 
absence and that her husband, John Cowden, had been seen 
riding with plaintiff; that after learning about the secret 
association of her husband with plaintiff, she instituted sult 
for divorce against him on the ground of adultery, naming 
plaintiff as co-respondent. A copy of the divorce decree was 
introduced in evidence which indicates that the divorce was 
granted in favor of Mrs. Cowden and that the proceeding 
was uncontested. 
The chief witness for the defendant was Mr. John Cowden, 
the defendant's former husband. He testified that while he 
was married to the defendant, he visited the Stubbs' borne fre-
quently in the absence of Mr. Stubbs, and had, on a number 
of occasions, gone ont riding with the plaintiff; that he had 
tried to get Ms wife to dismiss the divorce action but she 
would not agree; that he would like for his wife to take him 
back; that about thirty days hefore the hearing· of the di-
vorce suit, he told l1is lawyer that he was guilty of the charg·e, 
and that was the reason he did not contest it; that the plain-
tiff gave him a lock of her hair, a photograph, and wrote him 
certain notes and letters which were introduced in evidence; 
that be had never written the plaintiff and had kept he1· 
5* letters to prove that '~the plaintiff was pursuing him, be-
cause she had threatened that she was going to tell her 
husband an.¢1 the defendant if he, Cowden, broke off relations 
with her; that he had a good wife nnd he did not think the 
plaintiff had a right to sne her in view of bis relationsllip 
with the plaintiff (R., p. 18). 
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ASSIGNMENT OF.ERROR. 
The error assig·ned is the action of the trial court in set-
ting aside the verdict of the jury in the first trial and order-
ing a new trial (R., p. 4). The motion to set aside the ver-
dict was based upon the following· grounds: 
(1) T.hat it was contrary to the law and the evidence. 
(2) That it was excHssive. 
(3) That the amount of the verdict wa$ so gross]y dis-
proportionate to the injuries and· so unreasonable under the 
circumstances of the case, that it was evident that the jury 
acted under the influence of gross error, partiality, pa·ssion 
or prejudice, or had in some w~y 1hisconceived or misinter-
preted the facts or the law which should have guided them 
in a just conclusion. ! 
( 4) Failure of the court to grant instruction "C" asked 
for by the def enda.nt, and the granting of instruction No. 3 
for the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. 
(5) That the court erred in permitting, over the objection 
of the defendant, evidence of other people calling· the plain-
tiff over the telephone and annoying her without connecting 
the defendant with them. '. 
(6) Improper argument of counsel for plaintiff. 
.. 6{:: • (7) After discovered evidence. 
THE VERDICT WAS NOT CONTRARY TO THE LAW 
. AND THE EVID}}NCE. 
In view of the verdic.t of the jury
1 
in favor of the plaintiff~ 
all controverted matters arising out of c.onflicts of evidence 
must be resolved in favor of the p~aintiff and the ,widence, 
as. a whole, considered from the plaintiff's viewpoint. · 
· The evidence of the witness, Edwhrd Phelps, definitely es-
tablishes that the defendant used th~ grossly insulting words 
in question, as alleged in the plaintiff~s notice of motion. 
This fact ,being found by the jury's verdict, it next became 
their duty to assess damages against the defendant. The 
jury· were so instructed in instruction "P-1" which was 
~ranted at. the request of the plaintiff, without objection or 
exception interposed by the defendant, and became the law 
of the case. This instruction was as follows: 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence t.hat the defendant spoke of and concerning the 
plaintiff the specific insulting words alleged in .the notfoe. of 
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motion filed in this action, it is conclusively presumed that 
said allegations are false and the assertion of such charges 
was an unlawful act on the part of the defendant for whicJ1 
she must answer in damages, the amount of which is to •be 
determined upon the principles laid clown in the other in-
structions given the jury.'' 
No further recital of the evidence is necessary to sub-
stantiate the fact that the verdict was not contrarv to the 
law and evidence. This ground for setting aside the verdict 
is plainl~thout merit. 
7'" /.THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE. 
The second and third grounds for SE'tting aside the verdict 
are based upon the claim that the verdict was exces~ive. At 
the time this question was presented to the trial court: the 
case of Kroger Grocery Co. v. Ro.~enba,um, 171 Va. 158, was 
pending in the Supreme Court, but had not been decided. 
The verdict in the case at bar was set aside on Februarv 2, 
1938; the decision in the above cited case was made on Sep-
tember 9, 1938. A reyiew of the remaining grounds for set-
ting aside the verdict in this case leaves no doubt that the 
trial court set aside the verdict on the ground that it was 
excessive. The verdict of the jury was for Five Thousand 
($5,000.00) Dollars, wl1ich amonnt, at that time, wns in ex-
cess of the average verdicts for libel, slander, or insulting-
words in this state. 
In the above cited case, the insulting language complained 
of took place in a convel'sntion between plaintiff's supervisor, 
Dillon, and the plaintiff, Rosenbaum, in the following· words: 
"Rosenbaum, you are c>hecked out". "Then asked by the 
plaintiff "vV:hat for?", Dillon rrpli eel: "You ~i:ot us for 
$100.00 last week' 1• In that case, just as in the case at bar·, 
the defendant failed to file a plea of justification and only 
entered a plea of not g;unty. Under that plea, defendant in-
troduced nine witnesses in nn attempt to prove that plaintiff 
was guilty of fourteP.n different erimes while in the employ 
of defendant. Likewise, in the case at ,bar, the defendant in-
troduced the evidence of Rceret. association between the plain-
tiff and her former husband, .J obn Cowden, tog·etber with 
the testimonv of l1e1' former lmsband to prove th::it *he 
8· had illicit relations witl1 the plaintiff and also introduced 
certain letters, noteR! a lock of hair. and photo?:raph of 
plaintiff, which defendant '8 husband claimed he received 
from the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied writing these notes 
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and letters, and denied giYing defendant's husband a lock of 
her hair, and her photograph, and' the jury, by its verdict, 
accepted the plaintiff's testimony and rejected this evidence 
as spurious. 
In the Kroger Grocery Co. case~ the jury rendered a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff for Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) 
Dollars, and defendant moved the court to set it aside on the 
ground that it was excessive, which motion was overruled. 
In affirming tllis judgment, the court, in the course of its 
opinion, on page 165, stated as follows: 
"In our investig·ation of the Virginia decisions it appears 
that the damages awarded in the instant case are the largest 
awarded in any cas<:' considered by this court. It may be 
said here, as was said in the Boyd Case, supra, that the dam-
ages awarded do seem large, but an examination of the rec-
ord affords an answer to the contention that the jury were 
actuated by prejudice or passion. Under the plea of not 
guilty, filed by defendant, it was limited in its defense to 
the narrow issue of utterance of the alleged slander and 
whether or not the language employed was sufficient to base 
an action thereon. But the defendant was not content to 
rely upon that defense. It undertook, without incurring the 
risk of a plea of justification, to wreck the character of the 
plaintiff by painting him as a criminal incarnate and guilty 
of fourteen different crimes, rangh1g from petty larceny to 
subornation of perjury." I 
"In the face of the excellent cha~acter of the plaintiff, as 
testified to by his neighbors, the jury declined to be made a 
party to this effort of the defendant.'' 
I 
I 
And in concluding its opinion, the following· significant 
statement, on page 165, was made :I 
'' If there is to be, a new rule for the ascertainment of dam-
ages in a case of insulting words, under the statute, it 
9* must be *declared hy the General Assembly and not by J the appellate court." 
In the case at bar, the defendant used ]ang-uage much more 
insulting to the plaintiff than the insulting lang-uage used 
in the above cited case. The imputation made against the 
plaintiff in that case was as to his honesty. In the instant 
case, the plaintiff. a married woman, who, according to her 
neighbors, was of good moral character, was characterized 
Lillian Stubbs v. Frances Cowden 7 
and denominated bv the defendant as a ''whore" and "a 
common reprobate'; and as further evidence of the defend-
ant's malieiousness in using words of such a grievous and 
wanton nature, the defendant called the plaintiff "a red-
headed English son-of-a-bitch'' and went so far as to tele-
phone plaintiff's husband and tell him that the plaintiff was 
guilty of misconduct with her husband and with other men. 
A more vicious and vindictive example of slander could 
hardly be imagined. 
In the light of the opinion handed down in the case above 
cited, it is respectfully submitted that the verdict was not 
excessive and to set it aside on that ground, amounts to re-
versible error. 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Only two exceptions were taken with reference to instruc-
tions. The first exception was to the refusal of the court to 
grant instruction "C", which instruction is as follows: 
''The Court instructs the jury that if you believe, from 
the evidence, that the defendant obtained a divorce from her 
husband in the .Circuit Court of the Citv of Norfolk on the 
ground of adultery with the plaintiff, that decision of the Cir-
cuit Court of the Citv of Norfolk is conclusive on that 
10* issue and had adjui~ated the fact f/.'that the plaintiff 
was guilty of adultery as charged in the divorce case." 
The action of the court in refusing this instruction was 
manifestly correct. The evidence discloses that the plaintiff 
was not made a party to the divorce suit brought by defend-
ant against her husband, .John Cowden, in the Circuit Court 
of the .City of Norfolk, Virginia. She was me~el~r named a:.-, 
co-respondent in the bill of complaint. The defendant, .John 
Cowden, did not contest the action and the divorce was ob-
tained by Frances Cowden in an e~r parte bearing and in the 
absence of Lillian StubbR, the plaintiff. The decision of thP. 
Circuit Court granting Frances Cowden a divorce on the 
ground of adultery could not, under these circumstances bn 
considered an adjudication of the fact that plaintiff was 
guilty of adultery so as to rend~r such finding binding and 
conclusive on tl1at issue in tlie trial of the case at bar. 
The defendant also excepted to the action of the court in 
granting· instruction "P-3", whic11 was as follows: 
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"The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the alleged insulting- words complained of in 
the notice of motion, were of a grievous and wanton nature 
and manifest a. wilful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, 
actual malice need not be shown to entitle the plaintiff to ex-
emplary or punitive damages.'' 
An instruction in almost identical language was granted 
at the request of the plaintiff in the case of Williams Print-
in,q Oo. v. Saunders 1.13 Ya. 156, page 167. In this case, the 
judgment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff was 
affirmed. It is necessary in order to recover punitive dam-
ages, for the defendant to have been actuated by *ex-
11 * press or actual malice, but it is sufffcient to satisfy this 
requirement if the insulting words were of a grievous 
and wanton nature and manifest al wilful disreg·ard of the 
rig·hts of the plaintiff. If the evidence meets this test, then 
the plaintiff need not show express; or actual malice on the 
part of the defendant. The jury was fully and correctly in-
structed on the question of punitive: damages in instructions 
"P-3", "P-4" and "P-5" (R.., pp. 23 & 24). · 
I 
ALLE.GED ERROR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE. 
Another ground urged by the defendant for setting aside 
t.he verdict was tl1e action of the trial court in admitting evi-
dence of other people calling· the plaintiff ov<1r the telephone 
and annoying· her, without such evidence connecting the de-
fendant with tliem. 
The theory of the plaintiff was that the defendant fre-
quently called her up herself and on occasion called her and 
tried to dis~:uise l1er voice and that the defendant was in n 
la rg-e mea~ai·r~ responsible for the circulation of the rumors 
in the neighborhood to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of 
improper relations with defendant's husband and wa.s keep-
ing secret engagements with him. Although it was not neces-
sarily of any great importance, the evidence that frequent 
calls over the telephone annoying the plaintiff were being 
made during· tlrn time this agitation started by the defend-
ant was going on, wa.s properly admitted for what it wa.s 
worth and the question of whether or not these calls could 
be attributed to the defendant was~ ,under the circumstances. 
a proper one to be submitted to the jury. · 
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ALLEGED IMPRJOPER ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
The basis for this ground set up by the defendant is: 
12• * (1) That counsel for the plaintiff in commenting on 
the emphasis given by the counsel for the defendant to 
certain letters, photographs and lock of hair before the jury, 
said the plaintiff must have been g-reatly humiliated by the 
presence of her husband in t.he courtroom during the defend-
ant's argument; and, 
(2) That plaintiff's com1sel argued before the jury that 
the original purpose of the law under which this action was 
brought, was to prevent duelling; that its intention is to of-
fer remedy to one who is aggrieved by its violation and 
thereby avoid the temptation to one so aggrieved, of fakiug 
the law in his own hands to redress such wrong. 
We submit that in both of these instances, the argument 
was legitimate and proper, and that the action of the trial 
court in overruling the defendant's objection was without 
error. 
A:B,TER DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
The after discovered evidence is set forth in the three af-
fidavits submitted bv the defendant. One of these affidavits 
was made by the defendant~ Frances Cowden, and the pur-
port of it is that after the jury's verdict, her former hus-
band, who had already testified as to his intimacy with the 
plaintiff when he was on the witness stand, had now '' finally 
admitted to her" that he had hcen with plaintiff to North 
Carolina on several occn sions unaccompanied by anyone else, 
and that he had spent some time 'Yith plaintiff, on one occasion, 
in a tourist cabin at the Routliern Tavern. A second affidavit 
furnished by one, Stephen Cutrell of Camden, North 
13* Carolina, corroborated the new evidence, *emanating 
from ,John Cowden, to th() effect that Cowden and the 
plaintiff were seen by him top;ether at Texaco Beach in Cam-
den County, and also in Elizabeth City, nncl that they were at a 
baseball game at TexaPo Beach on J u]y 5, 1937, and sta~"ed 
at the dance the night of .July 5, 19'37, and that the dance 
lasted until two o'elock, A. M., .Ju]y 6, 1937. The third a.f-
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ndavit was made by j_ ·w. Bennett aiid the purport of this 
affidavit was likewise to corroborate the new evidence dis-
closed by John Cowden after his testimony and after the 
adverse jury verdict to the effect .that Cowden and the plain-
tiff occupied a tourist cabin at the Southern Tavern on the 
morning of July 6, 1~37, at five o'c.loek, A. ~-, the deponent 
beh1g the ,Qperator of t~e Southern Tavern Tourist Cabins. 
Burks' Pleatling and Practice ( 3rd Ed.), at page 536; states 
the law O:ri tliis subject RS f ollchvs : . 
'' A new trial for after-discovered evidence is granted with 
great reluctance and with special c'are and caution; In ,or-
der to justify a new trial for ~fterrdiscovered evidence; (~} 
the evidence must ha.ve befn discovered since the trial, (b) 
it must be material in its object and such as on another trial 
ought to produce oppo~ite results op ~he merits, (c) it must 
not be merely cumulative; corroborative, or. collateral; and 
( d) it must be evidence that could not have been discovered 
before the trial ~y the use of. due diligence, and such as can 
be produced at another trial. '' 1 
All of the newly discovered evidence in this case emanates 
from the defendant's husband. .John Cowden. He was a 
witness for the defendant and, testified in substance to the 
subject matter rec.itecl in the affidavits. The evidence at ibest 
would be cumulative, corroborative and collateral. It does 
not go to the merits of the case and could not have the ef-
fect of producing ''opposite results on the .merits"~ 
14* *Under the law of the case, as .set 01it in the instructions, 
to which no exceptions were fa.ken, evidence of the na-
ture contained in the affidavits could only serve to mitigat.e 
damages and could not bring about :a verdict for the defend-
ant. · 
------. The case of Nadenbonsch. v. Sharer, 4 W. Va. 203; l\fichie's 
Va. & W. Va. Digest, Yol. 7, page 729, holds as follows: 
"Where it does not appear that the newly-discovered evi-
dence would have gone to the merits, of the case if it had been 
in evidence upon the former trial, it is no ground for a new 
trial that it would have been proper to have been considered 
by the jury in mitigation of damages." 
The newlv discovered evidence offered by the defendant 
falls far short of satisfying the foregoing requirements and 
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the award of a new trial, based on this evidence, would be 
plainly unwarranted. · 
CONCLUSION. 
The only error assig-ned in this petition is the error of the 
trial court in setting aside the verdict of the jury in the first 
trial, on motion of the def endaut, and awarding a new trial. 
The seven grounds set up in def enda.nt 's motion for a. new 
trial have ibeen discussed under appropriate captions, and the 
argument has been confined to the action of the trial court 
in setting aside the verdict. Under the rule, as stated in 
the case of Barry v. Tyler, 171 Va. a81, where an action has 
been tried twice and the only question raised on appeal is 
whether the trial court erred in setting aside the first ver-
dict, the reviewing court will look to the record of the first 
trial and if the trial court erred in setting aside the verdict 
of the first trial, the first verdict will be reinstated, and 
15* all proceedings *subsequent thereto, ammlled. 
It is respectfully submitted that the first trial was a 
fair and impartial trial, according· to the law and evidence, 
in which a jury has resolved all .questions in favor of the 
plaintiff. The full purpose of the law has been accomplished 
when the parties ha.ve Imel one fnl1 and fair trial, and for 
the reasons stated in this petition, it is respectfully urged 
that petitioner be granted a writ of error, and that the jury's 
verdict of the first trial be reinstated and a final judgment 
entered thereon for the plaintiff. 
This petition will be filed with .Justice J olm W. Eggleston 
at his office in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, accompanied by 
a transcript of the record and a. check for one dollar and fifty 
cents ($1.50) filing fee to the Clerk of this court. This peti-
tion is adopted as the openh1~· brief and a copy was delivered 
to attornev for the defendant in error on the 15th dav of 
May, 1941: Oral arg1.1ment is requested. ·· 
Respectfully submitted, 
LILLIAN STUBBS, 
By BROUDY & BROUDY, 
Her Attorneys, 
820 Bank of Commerce Building, 
Norfolk, Va. 
We, the undersigned counsel practicinn: in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Yir~iinia, do certify that in our opinion 
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there is sufficient matter of error in the record ac.com-
16• panying this petition *to render it proper that the de-
cision in the above entitled case be reviewed and re-· 
versed by this Honorable Court. 
,JJ L. BROUDY, 
M. R. BROUDY. 
Received May 16, '1941.. 
I 
I 
J. W. E. 
June 5, 1941. ·writ of error awarded by the court. Bond 
$300. 
VIRHINIA: 
RECORD 
I 
M. B. W. 
Pleas before the Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk, at tl1e courthouse of said City, on Monday, the 
31st day of March, 1941. 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: On the 4th 
day of December, 1937, came Lillian Stubbs, plaintiff, by 
her attorneys, and filed in the Clerk's Office of said Court. 
her Notice of M1:.tio /for J uclgment against Frances Cowden, 
defendant, in the ords and figures I following: 
I 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
To : Mrs. Frances Cowden 
'1Villoughby Bay Avenue 
Norfolk, Virginia 
TAKE NOTICE That on the 20th day of December, 1937, 
at ten o'clock. A. M., the undersigned will move the said 
Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
for judgment against you for the sum of Five Thousand 
($5,000.00) Dollars, dne from you to the undersigned for 
this, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 18th day of October, 1937, 
in the City of Norfolk, "Virginia, in a certain discourse which 
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you then and there had in the presence and in the hearing 
of one, Edward B. Phelps, you, well knowing the undersigned 
to be a good, respectable and reputable citizen of this Com-
monwealth, and as such, reputed, esteemed and accepted by 
and amongst all the neighbors of the undersigned and other 
good and worthy citizens of this Commonwealth, to whom the 
undersigned was known~ but contriving and ma-
page 2 } liciously intending to insult the undersigned, and to 
injure the undersig'Iled in her g·ood name, fame and 
credit, and to bring the undersigned into public infamy, 
scandal, and disgrace, you at the time and place aforesaid, 
maliciously, falsely and insultingly spoke of and concerning· 
the undersigned the false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, 
and insulting words following, which are, from their usual 
construction and common acceptation, construed as insults, 
and tend to violence, and breach of the peace, and which were 
construed as insults by those who heard them to-wit: '' She 
(meaning the undersigned) is a whore and common reprobate, 
and worse than the people on J~ast Main Street.'' 
Wherefore, judgment for said sum, will be asked at the 
hands of the said Court at the ti.me and place hereinabove 
set out.. 
Given under my hand this 2nd day of December, 11937. 
BROUDY & BROUDY, 
p. q. 
RE·TURN. 
LILLIAN STUBBS. 
By Counsel. 
·r 
Not finding Frances Cowden, nor aJ\'-? member of her famil:v 
above the age of 16 at his/lwr usual place of abode I executed 
the within process in the City of Norfolk, Va. this the 3 day 
of Dec. 1937, by leaving· a copy h~reof posted at the front 
door of her place of abode. 
B. .r. KING, 
Sergt. City of Norfolk, Va., 
By W. CARMINE, Deputy. 
page 3 ~ And afterwards: In the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, on the 1st clay of Febru-
ary, 19'38. 
14 
I 
I 
Supreme Court of Appalls of Virginia 
i 
This day came the parties by their attorneys and there-
upon the defendant pleade~ not guilty to which _the plaintiff 
replied generally and then came a jury, to-wit: W. G. Slaugh-
ter, L. F. Tucker, S. J. Henderson, A. M. Higgins, Collins 
Hill, A. J. Kirsch, and C. H. Blair, who being sworn the 
truth to speak upon the issue join,ed, and having heard a 
part of the evidence at five o'clock P. M. are adjourned until 
ten o'clock tomorrow morning. 
And afterwards: In said Court, ion the 2nd day of ],eb-
ruary, 1938. : 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys and 
also came a.gain the jury pursuant tp their adjournment and 
having fully heard the evidence, returned a verdict in these 
words, "We the jury find for the plaintiff and award clam~ 
ages in amount of $5,000.00. '' 
Whereupon the defendant moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and grant ! her a new trial on the 
grounds that the said verdict is contrary to the law and the 
evidence, the further hearing of which motion is continue~. 
And afterwards : In said Court on the 2nd day of March, 
1938. 
page 4 ~ This day came again the parties, by their attor-
neys, and the defendant's motion to set aside the 
verdict of the jury rendered herein on February 2~ 1938, 
being fully heard by the Court, is sustained. 
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that the said verdict 
be and it is herebv set aside and a new trial awarded. 
To which ruling of the Court the plaintiff duly excepted. 
And afterwards: In said Court, on the 1st day of Feb-
ruary, 1941. 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and no 
party demanding a jury, and the plaintiff electing not to put 
on any evidence, the whole mntter of law and fact was heard 
and determined by the Court. 
Therefore it is considered by the Court that the plaintiff 
take nothing by her notice of motion for judgment and that 
the defendant go thereof without day and recover of the 
plaintiff her costs by h~r in this behalf expended. 
To which judg·ment of tl1e Court the plaintiff duly excepted. 
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.And now, In said ·Court on the 31st day of March, 1941. 
page 5 ~ This day came the parties, by their attorneys, 
and it appearing to the Court that the defendant 
has had reasonable notice in writing of the time and place, 
the plaintiff presented to the Court her certificates of excep-
tion, numbered 1 and 2, and the defendant appearing by her 
attorney presented to the Court her certificates of exception 
numbered 3, 4, 5 and 6 and thereupon the parties moved the 
court to sign and make the same a part of the record herein 
which is accordingly done., and within sixty days from the 
entry of final judgment herein. 
The following are the certificates of exception referred to 
in the foregoing order: 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
The following evidenee on behalf of the plaintiff and of 
the defendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all the 
evidence that was introduced at the trial of this case: 
EDWARD PHELPS, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
Tha.t he is employed at the Naval Air Rta.tion at the Naval 
Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, that his wife is the sister 
of J. B. Stubbs, the plaintiff's husband; that the first time 
he met Mrs. Cowden, the defendant, and her husband was 
on New Year's Eve in 1936 at the Stubbs' home; that some-
time later,. the defendant. accompanied .by her brother, 
"8peed" Fentress, came to the placfl where he worked at the 
Naval Base and inquired whether he had attended the wed-
ding at Philadelphia of a relative of bh; which took place 
in May of that year, statin?: that she had heard 
page 6 ~ that he, Phelps~ and his wife, Mrs. Phelps, and Mrs. 
Stubbs, the plaintiff, had gone to the wedding. He 
replied that he and his wife did not attend the, wedding. That 
on the following day, sl1e came back alone and asked him to 
find out where the plai11tiff went on the 4th day of .July, to 
which he replied that it was none of his business and that he 
had no intention of complying· v.rith her request; that Mrs. 
Cowden then stated that the plaintiff l1ad been talking abont 
him and had stated that the reason she and Mr. Stubbs don't 
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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come to see him more often is because Mrs. Phelps, his wife, 
"sponges" on her and that when M1·s. Stubbs and Mrs. 
Phelps g·o downtown, Mrs . .Stubbs always has to pay her way; 
that he advised her that he knew nothing about that and that 
he was not interested in the various statements which she 
made; that the last time he saw her was on October 18, 1937, 
when Mrs. Cowden again came to see him at the Naval Base; 
that on this occasion, she told him tha.t she was going to sue 
her husband for divorce and intended to get a divorce no 
matter how she got it; that she called Mrs. Stubbs, the plain-
tiff, a. "whore" and "a common reprobate" and said that she 
was worse than people on East Main Street, and also that 
her husband, :Mr. Stubbs, was so damned dumb that he 
couldn't see through it, but that she was going to show him, 
when she got throug·h with her that he would be mig·hty glad 
to send her back to England. 
MR. J. B. STUBBS, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
I 
That he is the husband of Lillian StubbR, the plaintiff, that 
they were married in England about seventeen 
pag·e 7 ~ years ago; that he is an employe of the .American 
Railway Express Company: that he worked from 
two o'clock in the afternoon to ei~ht-thirty in the evening 
and usually got borne around nine o 'dock; that he and Mr. 
Cowden had been very friendly and that the latter had helped 
him build his home; that he wa8 sure tlmt the accusations 
made ag·ainst his wife with reference to her alleged intimacy 
wit11 Mr. Cowden were not true and: that he had the greatest 
confidence in her; tlmt someone had tapped the telephone 
wires leading to llis home and that lhe and his wife were so 
molested by calls over tbe t«?lephone that he had to get the 
telephone company to put in a new 'phone with a. secret num-
ber. (The defendant objected to the evidence that ''some-
·oue had tapped his telephone wires" on the ground that there 
was no evidence that the defendnnt was responsihle for this 
action and the admission of this evidenC'e was prejudicial 
to tl1e defendant. 'rhe objection was overruled and defend-
ant excepted.) 
The witness testified further that on one occasion Mrs. 
Cowden. the defendant, called llim on the telephone and at-
tempted to dis~:uise her vofoe; in this conversation she told 
him tlutt if he would 11ave his teleph01rn line tapped, he would 
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hear very important conversations between his wife and other 
men between 5 and 6 :30 P. M.; she stated further that every-
body knew his wife ~s reputation except him, and that if he 
would have his lines tapped he would find out plenty about 
her; that Mr. ,Cowden would have been back home long ago 
if it had not been for Mrs. Stubbs; that she listened in on a 
conversation between Mr. Cowden and Mrs. Stubbs the night 
before, in which l\tlrs. Stubbs threatened to have 
page 8 ~ him (Mr. Stubbs) shoot Mr. Cowden if he did not 
go through with the divorce which was then pend-
ing between them. She further stated that he would have 
more than one man to shoot and that the people down in 
the neighborhood where he lived knew a great deal which 
would all come up later and that if he was not so dumb, he 
would have known what was going on long ago. 
Mr. Stubbs further testified that before this agitation wa$ 
started by Mrs. Cowden, he and his wife were very happy 
together and used to cal] each other up over the telephone 
daily, but. that now his wife had become hysterical as a re-
sult of the telephone calls and rumors spread about her, and 
his wife had been humi1iated and harassed to a degree that 
was unbearable. 
LILLIAN STUBBS, 
the plaintiff, testified in her own behalf as follows: 
That she was born in Eng-land and married J. B. Stubbs, 
in tha.t country in 1920 and came to Norfolk with her husiband 
in 1921; that Frances Cowden, the defendant, and her hus-
band visited l1e-r house on New Year's Eve, 19·36; tlmt on 
September 13, 1937, the defendant c.alled her up and tried 
to disguise her voice, hut after talking to her some little 
time, over the telephone, sh~ reeognized her voice and on 
that occasion, used substantially the same insulting· lang11ag·e 
towards her that she subsequently used in the presence of 
Mr. Phelps;- that the defendant also called her'' a red-bended 
English son-of-a-bitch" and told her that she was going to 
be sent back to England where s]ie came from, if she did 
not leave dofendant's husband alone; that she was 
page 9 ~ frequently called up and annoyed over the tele-
phone by various people; that the annoyance was 
so great that she was compelfod to have the telephone changed 
to a secret number; that even after the number wa.s changed, 
she kept receiving similar telephone calls and it worried her 
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a great deal; that the defendant frequently cailed her up 
and asked if Mr. ,Cowden was there; that Mr. Cowden had 
never visited her in the absence of her husband, Mr. Stubbs; 
that Mr. Cowden did come to their premises and help her 
husband in the construction of his house on evenings when 
they were both off from their work; that Mr. Cowden also 
kept his fishing nets in their yard; that she had heard that 
Mrs. Cowden was going to bring ~uit for divorce against 
her husband and would name her i as co-respondent; that 
Mr. Cowden had promised her that he would contest th~ 
case and she relied on his pro:rµise in this respect; that shortly 
after the divorce suit was filed, she consulted counsel for 
the purpose of protecting her interests; that she did not 
know until shortly before the trial of the divorce case, that 
Mr. Cowden was not going to contest it; that on the morn-
ing of December 4, 1937, when the evidence was to be heard 
in the divorce case .in Court, she was present in her lawyer's 
office and shortly after ten o'clock, she ascertained that the 
defendant had obtained her divorce; and that it was uncon-
tested; that Mr. Phelps repeated to her·, the insulting lan-
guage directed against her which was spoken to him by the 
defendant; that the peace and happiness of her home and 
her health had been seriously disrupted by reason of the de-
fendant's activities and the numerous telephone 
page 10 ~ calls; and that she was not after the money, hut 
wanted to put a stop to any further annoyance; 
that the telephone call which Mrs. ,Cowden made in which 
the defendant aibused her, was made on September 13, 1937, 
because she made a notation of it at the time and that she 
read from that paper while testifying. (The defendant ob-
jected to the foregoing evidence of a1leged insulting words 
or statements alleged to have been made by defendant to plain~ 
tiff over the telephone, which were not alleged in the plain-
tiff's notice of motion, on the ground: tl1at the plaintiff should 
be confined to the allegations in the notice of motion. The 
Court ruled that this testimony was admissible, but could 
be considered by the jury only on the issue of malice, to which 
ruling the defendant excepted). 
On cross examination, counsel for the defendant after ex-
amining the memorandum from which the plaintiff was tes-
tifying, asked her how it was that the paper contained nota-
tions of dates subsequent to September 1:3. Plaintiff's an-
swer was that she had kept dates Qf the various calls on a 
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calendar and copied them from the calendar on that paper. 
(The memorandum was introduced in evidence as plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1.) She denied having any improper relations 
with Mr. Cowden and further denied that she had ever gone 
to a restaurant with hi~ or that she had ever sent him let-
ters or notes of any kind, or that she had given him her 
photograph or a lock of her hair, and counsel for the de-
fendant told her that he expected to contradict her in these 
respects. 
page 11} MRS. R. W. DEAN, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
That she lived in 805 Blair Avenue, Norfolk, Virginia; 
that she knew the plaintiff and knew her reputation for truth 
and veracity which, she testified, as good. 
J. M. MOSELY, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
That he lives at 7W ,v. 51st Street, Norfolk, Virginia.; 
that he had lived near the plaintiff from October, 1935, to 
August, 1936; that he and his wife visited Mr. and Mrs. 
Stubbs often and that Mrs. Stubbs' character was good. 
MRS. RUTH PHELPS, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
That she is a sister of Mr. Stubbs; that she lives in Ester-
brook; that she and the plaintiff used to knit together and 
that for the past three years she was in the plaintiff's com-
pany about four or five days each week; that Mrs. Stubbs' 
character was good. 
MRS. MAMIE FISHER, 
testified on. behalf of the plaintiff as follows : 
That she had lived in the same neighborhood with the 
plaintiff and had moved away in October, 1936; that Mrs. 
Stubbs' conduct was always proper; tl1at her character was 
good and that her reputation for truth and veracity in the 
neighbor hood was good. 
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Mr. Lockamy. 
MRS. MARY HANSON, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
I 
pag·e 12 ~ That she lived about a bloc.k and a half from 
the plaintiff; that she had known the plaintiff for 
about twelve years, the entire time she lived jn the neighbor~ 
hood; that she never Raw anything improper about Mrs. 
Stubbs' conduct; that Mrs. Stubbs': house was visible from 
her house and that she never saw Mr. Cowden visit the plain-
tiff's home in the absence, of the plaintiff's husband; that she 
still associates with the plaintiff. I 
Ou cross examination, l\rirs. Hanson admitted that she told 
Mrs. Cowden that on one occasion before she, Mrs. Cowden, 
brought suit for divorce from her husband, Mr. Stubbs picked 
her up in his automobile and asked her, Mrs. Hanson, if 
she had heard any of the rumors that were going around 
about Mrs. Stubbs' and Cowden 's I alleged intimacy. 
M:R. H. C. HANSON, 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
That he wa.s a neig·hbor of both plaintiff and defendant; 
that the defendant had on several occasions spoken to him 
about her husband's gambling his money away and that the 
defendant and her husband apparently had trouble for quite 
some time and on one occasion the defendant chased her lms-
band out of the house with a shotgun.· 
MR AND MRS. DIGGS, 
testified in behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
That they lived near l\.f rs. Stubbs; that they had h«'en liv-
ing there since June 15, 1.937 ; that if anyone had been going 
into the Stubbs' home from the side door, they 
page 13 ~ were in a position to see them; that they never saw 
:M:r. Cowden enter the Stubbs' home in that man-
ner and that they had never seen any improper conduct on 
Mrs. Stubbs' part; that they still associate with her. 
MR. LOCK.A.MY, 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows : 
That he works for the Virginia Electric & Power Com-
pany and has worked there for about twenty-five yea.rs; that 
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he had known Mrs. Cowden, the defendant, for a number of 
years; that she bore a good reputation and he would believe 
her. 
MRS. W. E. ALLEY, 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
That she lives on Sir Oliver Road in the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia; that she had known the defendant for a number 
of years; that defendant bore a good reputation for truth 
and veracity; and that she would believe her. 
MR. GEORGE OWENS, 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
That he had known the defendant for a number of years; 
that the defendant bore a good reputation for truth and 
veracity and that he would believe her. 
MRS. ROSE BENNETT, 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
That she and her husband were very close friends to Mr. 
and Mrs. ,Cowden; that her husband worked at the same place 
with Mr. Cowden; that Mrs. Cowden bears a good 
page 14 ~ reputation for truth and veracity. She also testi-
fied that she had tried to get Mr. and Mrs. Cowden 
together after their separation; that she had been sent by 
Mr. Cowden while the divorce suit was pending to try to 
get Mrs. Cowden to drop the suit, and when she approached 
Mr. iCowden about trying to make up with Mrs. Cowden, he 
admitted to her that he had an affair with Mrs. Stubbs and 
l1e would have a hard time breaking off with her. She also 
testified that in her conversation with Mr. Cowden while she 
was trying to get the Cowdens top;etl1er, he admitted to her 
that he had been to V.l oodhouse 's U.estaurant with Mrs. iStubbs, 
but he did not want her to tell Mrs. Cowden. She did. how-
ever, tell Mrs. Cowden on condition that the latter 'would 
never disclose from whom she got that information. At the 
trial of this case she was wiliing to release Mrs. Cowden 
from her obligation to keep that information a secret. 
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MR. S. J. BROWN, 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
That he lived at 68 Bayville A venue in the neighborhood 
where the Cowdens and Stubbs lived; that on several occa-
sions he had seen Mrs. Stubbs and Cowden together in the 
latter's automobile; that Cowden would pick her up about 
two blocks from her home and when I he would bring her back 
he would put her off about two blocks from home; that he 
had also seen them walking together on :Monticello Avenue, 
and only on one occasion did he ever see any third person 
in the car with them, and that was at Granby and 25th 
Streets; that he worked on 27th Street, and on his way to 
work from where he lived, he would catch a bus 
page 15 ~ to the Na.val Base where he would transfer to a 
street car which would bring him into Norfolk; 
that on several occasions while waiting for a street car at 
the Naval Base, he saw Mr. Cowden pick Mrs. Stubbs up in 
his automobile at the Naval Base~ that he saw Cowden's 
car parked a number of times in the ,voods back of the Stubbs' 
home; that on one occasion, he saw Cowden get out of the 
automobile after parking it in the
1 
woods and go into the 
Stubbs' home; on several occasions, he saw Cowden park 
his car and go through the woods ~owards the direction of 
the Stubbs' home; that it would have been easier and nearer 
for Cowden to approach the Stubbs' home by driving· in front 
of it than to have parked in the woods and walked to the 
home, but that if Mr. Cowden had driven or parked in front 
of the Stubbs' home, Mrs. Cowden c:Ould have seen him from 
where she lived. 
On cross examination, he admitted that several years a.go 
he had some difficulty with Mr. Stubbs, but he stated that the 
difficulty was straightened out between them. 
:MRS. VANDY.KE, 
testified on behalf of the defendant ns follows : 
That she lived next door to the Stubbs about 300 feet 
away; that· on several occasions she saw Cowden coming 
from the rear through the woods and go into the Stubb~' 
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home shortly befo,re five O 'cfock; that shottly after he we~t 
in the light._s would go out and. befor~ he lef{ the lights would 
go on; that she did not s~e Mr. Stubbs iii the ho11se ~t that 
time, but tliat shortly before nihe d 'clock, she saw Mr. Stribios 
come in; that she cotjld tell Mr. Shihl>s' car by the lights, 
which woula shine towards the house when he 
page 16 ~ turned into Willoughby Bay Avenue, and she could 
see Stubbs get out of the car and go int~ the house; 
that sh~ ha8 seen Cbwdeh several times come through the 
woods towards the dtrectioii of the Stubbs' home; that it 
would have beeri much easie1: for Cowden, if he wanted to 
go to the Stubbs' home, to have driven tip in fron~ thereof 
on the road insteaa of cbniirlg through the woods; tliat 
Cowden wore a khaki uniform. 
. . .. MRS .. ~TANWOQD, , . 
testified in belfalf of the defendant as follows: 
That sl1e had lived in t.he neighborhood w~ere the Cowdens 
ajid Stubbs live for several years, and had lmown Mrs. 
Oo"(vden fdr several years; that she saw Mr. Cowden '·s car 
pai·ked almost evei~)~ ~vening near her house on Florida Ave-
nue and 11-ear the woods; that Co,vderi would get out and go 
through the wobds in the direction of the Stubbs" home; that 
he wore a khaki uniform; that there had been a g"ood bit of 
g·ossip about Ccnvde~ and Mrs .. Sfobbs and out of curiosity 
sbe took. tlie license number of the automobile whieh she saw 
parked daily to make sure:it ,vas Cowden 's; that on one occa-
sion she called on ~{rs. Stubbs to get her to sig11 a petition, 
whic11 she was circulating for some pi1rpose, at which time 
:L\frs. Stubbs told her t]mt she llacl understood that she, Mrs. 
,Stanwood, was going to bCl a witness for Mrs. Cowden in her 
divorce snit against lier 1msband and that if she testified 
ag·ainst her, she would sue her . 
. TORN COWDEN, 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
page 17 ~ That he was. the husband of the defendant, but 
was recently divorced by her; that while married~ 
he had visited the Stubbs' home frequently; that he used to 
go riding· with Mrs. Stubbs without her husband~ and on 
several occasions they went to the Woodhouse Restaurant 
on the ,Shore Drive where they took meals; that a.fter his 
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wife sued him for divorce, Mrs. Stubbs told him to tell his 
wife that if she didn't drop the divorce suit, she would sue 
her; that Mrs. Stubbs told him he iwould have to fight the 
divorce suit and he thereupon employed counsel for that 
purpose; that he had tried to get his wife to dismiss the di-
vorce case 1but she wouldn ~t agTee; that he would like for his 
wife to take him back now; that a.bout thirty days before the 
divorce suit came up for a hearing; he told his lawyer that 
he could not fight the case because he was guilty of the charge 
and that is why he did not contest it; that in consulting coun-
sel and trying to get his ,vif e to drop the case, he was acting 
at the request of Mrs. Stubbs; that 'Mrs. Stubbs gave him a 
lock of her hair, a photograph, and wrote him notes and let-
ters. (The lock of hair, photograph, two notes and a letter 
were identified by the witness in whbse possession they were 
until introduced in evidence, and after they were shown to 
plaintiff and her counsel, were introduced in evidence as de-
fendant's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The lock 
of hair, which was introduced in evidence, has been lost, but 
it is conceded that when it was introduced, it appeared to 
be similar in appearance to the hair of the plaintiff. It is 
further conceded that the photograph introduced in evidence 
is a photograph of the plaintiff.) 
page 18 ~ The witness testified further tha.t he had never 
written to her, hut he kept everything she wrote 
to him; that shortly before this case came up for trial, he 
had beard that l\f rs. Stubbs was going to use him as a wit-
ness on her behalf, and fePling that he would harm her case, 
he endeavored to get. in touch with1 her lawyer so a·s to te]] 
him the truth about the case and thereby she might drop it., 
as he did not want this case .to come to court because it would 
disclose his relationship with Mrs. Stubbs and people would 
find out things they did not know I before; that after Mr8. 
Stubbs' telephone was cfomged, she gave him the silent 1mm-
ber, over which he called lier; t]iat she also called him over 
the telepl1one a.t the plaee where he boarded after he and his 
wife separated. 
On c.ross examination, hf' was asked why he kept the let-
ters which Mrs. Stubbs wrote him, and he stated that on 
several occasions he lrnd tried to hreak off his relationship 
with her and she threatened him that sl1e was going to tell 
her husband and Mrs. Cowden, and he wanted those letters 
to prove tliat sl1e, Urs. Stubbs, was pursuing him. He was 
also asked on cross examination ~vhetl1er he appeareil in 
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court to testify because of threats made against him if he 
didn't testify on behalf of Mrs. Cowden, or bec3:use he 
thought if he testified for her she would go back to live with 
him, and he stated that he was summoned to appear and 
denied any threats of bodily harm or promise of reconcilia-
tion if he testified for defendant; that he had a good wife 
and that he didn't think l\:lrs. Stubbs had a right to sue her 
in view of his relationship with her. 
page 19 ~ MR. BENNETT, 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
That he and Mr. Cowden worked together at the Naval 
Base; that he and his wife and the Cow dens were very 
friendly; that after the Cowdens separated, he and his wife 
had tried to get them to become reconciled, and he had talked 
to Cowden frequently about it and Cowden told him that he 
could not break away from Mrs. Stubbs; that Mrs. Stubbs 
was constantly calling Cowden over the telephone were he 
worked, and so frequently it began to annoy Cowden, and 
that Cowden came near losing his job on account of Mrs. 
Stubbs calling him up frequently on his job. 
MRS. co,vDEN, 
testified on her own behalf as follows: 
That she had lived at her present location for years; that 
the Stubbs' home was a.bout three or four hundred feet from 
where she lived; that she could see it from her porch; that 
the first time she called on the Stubbs was on New Year's 
Eve, 1936, when Mr. Cowden took her there, and that was 
after she had heard rumors about Cowdon and l\frs. Stubbs; 
that sbe went there primarily to acquaint herself with the 
location of the Stubbs' home; that on one occasion shP was 
standing- on a porch diagonally opposite the Stuibbs' home 
and she saw Cowden come out of there; that she got after 
him about it and ended up in an argument; that after hearing 
the rumors about her husband and Mrs. Stubbs, and having 
seen Cowden come out ()f the Stubbs' home, under the cir-
cumstances, it looked suspicious to her, and hav-
page 20 ~ ing observed a difference in her married life with 
Cowden since she had heard those rumors about 
his association with Mrs. Stubb~, she started investigating 
and found tl1at Cowden lrnd been visiting· Mrs. Stubbs in 
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· her husband's aibsence, and that he had been seen riding 
with Mrs. Stubbs; that Cowden would frequently be away 
from home apparently on a trip, and that would be about 
the same time Mrs. Stubbs would go away on a trip; that she 
was told by Mr. Stubbs on one occasion that Mrs. Stubbs 
Etnd Mr. and Mrs. Phelps had g·one to Philadelphia to at-
tend a wedding in May, Hl36, ancll at the same time Mr. 
Cowden had left town for a few days; that on July 5th, 1937, 
she and her brother were riding· through the Naval Base 
and when they passed the place whe,re Mr. Phelps was work-
ing, he stopped them, he having; met 1her before at the Stubbs' . 
home on the previous New Year's Eve; that she remarked to 
Mr. Phelps that he was doing a lot, of traveling· lately, hav-
ing recently returned from a vacation and also taking the 
trip to Philadelphia in May to attend the wedding of a rela-
tive; that Phelps replied that he did not go to any wedding·, 
to which she replied that Mr. Stubbs had told her that he. 
Mr. Phelps, his wife and Mrs. Stubbs had gone to the wed~ 
ding; that Phelps told her be l1ad not seen the Stubbs in about 
three months; that after having found out about Cowden's 
visits to the Stubbs' borne in the manner in which he visited 
there, and his secret association "iith Mrs. Stubbs, she in-
stituted suit for divorce in the Circuit ·Court of the Citv of 
Norfolk, against her husband in the, early part of September, 
1937, on the ground of hdultery, naming therein 
page 21 ~ Mrs. Stubbs as eo-respondent; that sometime after 
the suit was broug·ht, she happened to ride through 
the Na val Base, and in passing· the place where Phelps was 
working, he again hailed her and said he had seen where she 
had brought suit for divorce against her husband and had 
named Lillian as co-rei:;pondent and wanted to know if she 
thought she had en011gh evidence, to which she replied she 
thought she did; that her conversation at that time with 
Pl1elps was very brief because she was in a line of traffic and 
could not block it. She denied calling· the plaintiff "a. whore'' 
and "a common reprobate'' and deniP.d that she said plain-
tiff was worse than people on East Main Street, and denied 
using any insulting language towards her over the telephone. 
Rhe denied telling PhP-1,ps at any time she wanted to get a 
divorce from her husband in any kind of way and wanteci him 
to help her get evidence against him. She further stated 
tl1at if she wanted evidence of any improper relations be-
tween Cowden and Mrs. Atnbbs, she would not have gone to 
Phelps, Mrs. Stubbs' brother-in-law, for that purpose. She 
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further testified that while the divorce suit was pending, 
Cowden tried to g·et her to drop the suit, and told her that if 
she didn't drop it, Mrs. Stubbs would sue her. She further 
testified that she only called up Mrs. Stubbs over the tele-
phone on one ocoasion to find out if Mr. Cowden was there, 
and in tha.t conversation Mrs. Stubbs got after her about 
frequent telephone calls she got, and when Mrs. Cowden ex-
plained to her that she had not called before and was not 
responsible for the calls, Mrs. Stubbs apologized to her and 
said she had never heard her voice before, but thought it 
was her voice. She denied tapping or authorizing anyone 
else to tap the Stubbs' telephone, if it was ever 
page 22· J tapped; that she did not call her over the tele-
phone except on the occasion above mentioned, 
nor did she authorize anyone else to annoy her; that she knew 
some g·irls in the neighborhood named Mathews, who would 
call Mrs. Stubbs over the telephone when they would see 
Cowden go in there, merely for the purpose of teasing Mrs. 
Stubbs. She said l\frs. Stubbs knew those girls; that they 
would tell her it was Mrs. Cowden calling·. The girls told 
her so. She further testified that she did not know the silent 
number of the Stubbs' 'phone. She also testified that until 
M:rs. Stubbs and Cowden became over-friendly, she and 
Cowden g·ot along nicely, and that Mrs. Stubbs ·broke up her 
home; that she 0tbtained a divorce from her husband in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk on the ground of 
adultery with the pla.intiff, copies of the original papers in 
the divorce c~!~Jrving been introduced in evidence, and 
marked defen/ :.exhibits 6, 7 and 8. 
. W. S. '\VOODHOUSE. 
testified on behalf of the defendant as follows: 
That he operated a restaurant on the Shore Drive; that 
he knew Mr. Cowden and Mrs. Stubbs well; that on several 
occasions, Mr. Cowden and :M:rs. Stubbs, by themselvee, came 
to his restaurant and remained for three or four hours at 
the time. They did not occupy cabins. 
Teste : This 31st day of March, 1941. 
0. L. SHACKLEFORD, 
J udg·e of the Court of Law an<l Chancery. 
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page 23 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
The following instructions granted at the request of the 
plainQ:ff. a.ud of the defendant respectively, are all the in-
structions· that were gTanted on the trial of this case. The 
instructions granted at the request of the plaintiff are desig-
nated as '.'P-1'', ''P-2", "P-3", "P-4", "P-5", "P-6". The 
instructions: granted at the requesi of the defendant are 
designated as "A" and "B". · 
P-1 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that the defendant spoke of and concerning the 
plaintiff the specific insulting ~ords alleged in the notice of 
motion filed in this action, it is conclusively presumed that 
said allegations are false and the assertion of such charges 
was an unlawful act on the part of the defendant for which 
she must answer in damag·es, the amount of which is to be 
deter~ined upon the principles la.id down in the other instruc-
tions given the jury.'' 
P-2 
"The Court instructs the jury that the law presumes that 
damages result from the utterance of insulting· words~ and 
it is not necessary for tl1e plaintiff to prove either actual or 
pecuniary loss in order to recove~.'' 
P-3 
I 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the alleg·ed insulting· words complained of in 
the notice of mot.ion, were of a grievous and wan-
pag·e 24 ~ ton nature and manifest' a wilful disregard of the 
rights of the plaintiff, actual malice need not be 
shown to entitle the plaintiff to eY.emplary or punitive dam-
ages.'' 
P-4 
"The Court ini,tructs the jury that damages recoverable 
in actions of this character are of two classes: 
First: ActuRl or compensatory damages which embrace 
loss of reputation, shame, mortification: and injury to the 
feelings. 
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Second: Exemp]ary, or punitive damages which are dam-
ages that may be awarded by the jury where they believe 
that the insulting words, if they believe such insulting words 
were used and spoken by the defendant of and concerning 
the plaintiff, are falsely, maliciously, wilfully and deliberately 
,spoken of and concerning the plaintiff by the defendant.'' 
P-5 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that the defendant used the words in notice of mo-
tion mentioned, of and concerning the plaintiff, in bad faith, 
and with malice, and that such words from their usual con-
struction and common acceptation, are construed as insults 
and tend to violence and breach of the peace, then the jury 
must find for the plaintiff. And in assessing her damages, 
they may not only give her damages for the insult, and dam-
ages to compensate her for any injury done to her, as shown 
by the evidence, but damages also to punish the defendant for 
her offense and to deter others who may be similarly in-
clined.'' 
page 25 ~ P-6 
"The Court instructs tbe jury that the issue in this case 
is whether or not the defendant used the words upon which 
this action was brought in a conversation with Mr. Phelps. 
Evidence of alleged improper relations between Mr. Cowden 
and :M:rs. Stubbs, if believed by the jury, does not amount to 
a: complete defense to this action, if the .jury believes from 
the evidence that the defendant used tbe words in question.'' 
A 
'' The Court instructs the jt1ry that in this case the plain-
tiff charges that the def~ndant, on the 18th day of October, 
1937, _ falsely and maliciously told one Edward B. Phelps, 
the. plaintiff 'r.; brother-in-law. that she, tl1e plaintiff, was a 
whore and common reprobate, and so forth, as charged in the 
notice of motion. Tl1e burden js, therefore, on the plainiiff 
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the de-
fendant on the occasion aforementioned did use such lan-
guage of and concerning the plaintiff. And if the plaintiff 
has failed to prove tl1is allegation by a preponderance of the 
evidence, then it is your duty to find for the defendant." 
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B 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover anything in this case, then, in as-
sessing her damages, you may take into consideration her 
improper relations with Cowden if proven in this case, in 
mitigation of any dama~:es you may think she is entitled to.'' 
Teste: This 31st day of March, 1941. 
0. L. SHACKLEFORD, 
Judge of the Court of Law and Chancery. 
page 26 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 8. 
This is to certify that the defendant objected to the grant-
ing for the plaintiff of instmction I No. 3, in that it told the 
jury that actual malice need not be shown to entitle the plain-
tiff to punitive damages, but the Court overruled said objec-
tion, to which action the defendant duly excepted. 
The defendant contends that the above mentioned instruc-
tion was improper and misleading because the law is well 
settled that in order to recover punitive damages, actual 
malice must be shown. The instruction, as granted, per-
mitted the jury to award punitive damages without the neces-
sity of showing actual malice. I 
Tcste : This 31st day of March, 1941. 
0. L. SHACKLEFORD (Seal) 
Judge 
CERTIFICATFJ OF EXCEPTION NO. 4. 
This is to certify that the following· instruction was ten-
dered by the defendant, w·hich tlle Court refused to g·rant, 
to-wit: 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe, from the 
evidenc.e, that tJie defendant obtained a divorce from her 
husband in the Circuit Court of the Ci.tv of Norfolk on tJ1e 
g;round of adultery with the plaintiff, that decision of the Cir. 
cuit Court of the Citv of Norfolk is conclusive on that issue 
and had acljuclicated the fact that the plaintiff 
page 27 ~ was guilty of adultery as charged in the divor~e 
case,'' ' 
'• 
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to which action of the Court the defendant duly excepted. 
The defendant states that said instruction should have 
been given because in the divorce case between the defend-
ant and her husband, the plaintiff was named as co-respond-
ent and the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk so adjudi-
cated her. Furthermore, the record in the divorce proceed-
ings between the defendant and her husband, wherein the 
plaintiff was named as co-respondent, was introduced in evi-
dence without objection, and that, too, justified the granting 
of said instruction. 
Teste : This 31st day of March, 1941. 
0. L. SHACKLEFORD (Seal) 
Judge 
CERTI!FiCATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 5. 
This is to certifv that at the trial of this case counsel for 
the plaintiff, commenting on the emphasis given by counsel 
for the defendant relating- to certain letters, photograph and 
lock of hair, argued before the jury that the plaintiff must 
have been greatly humiliated by the presence of her husband 
in the courtroom during the defendant's argument. Coun-
sel for the defendant objected to the above argument as be-
ing· highly improper and prejudicial to the defendant, and 
only tended to prejudice. the defendant in the eyes of the 
jury, but the Court overruled the defendant's objeetion and 
the defendant duly excepted. 
page 28 ~ Plaintiff's counsel further argued before the 
jury that the original purpose of the law under 
which tllis action was broug11t was to prevent duelling; that 
its policy is to offer remedy to one wl10 is aggrieved by it8 
violation, and thereby avoid the temptation to one so ag-
grieved from ta.king· tlle law in Ms own hand to redress such 
wrong. Counsel for the defendant objected to that line of 
argument on the gTound that thnt was not the purpose of 
the law, and that it wns hig·llly improper and prejudicial to 
the defendant in tlie eyes of the jury, but the Court overruled 
the defendant's objection, to which ac.tion the defendant duly 
excepted. 
Teste: This 31st day of March, 1941.. 
0. L. SHACKLEFORD (Seal) 
Judge 
,/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 6. 
This is to certify that affor the instruc.tions were read to 
the jury and the case was argued by counsel, the jury re-
turned to the Court the following , verdict: 
"We the jury find for the plaintiff and award damages 
in amount of $5,000.00. W. G. Slartghter, lt.,oreman.'' 
Whereupon, the defendant moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and grant her a new trial on the fol-
lowing grounds : , 
1. That it was contrary to law and the evidence. 
2. That it was excessive. 
page 29 ~ 3. That the amount of the verdict was so gTossly 
disproportionate to the injury and so unreason-
able under the circumstances of the case that it was evident 
the jury acted under the influence of gross error, partiality, 
passion or prejudice, or had in some way misconceived or 
misinterpreted the facts or the law which should have guided 
them in a just conclusion. 
4. The failure of the Court to grant instruction '' C'' asked 
for by the defendant, and the granting of instruction No. :3 
for the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. 
5. T'hat the Court erred in permitting, over the objection 
of the defendant, evidence of other people calling the plam-
tiff over the telephone and annoying her without connecting 
the defendant with them. 
6. Improper argument of counsel for t]1e plaintiff. 
7. After disc-overed evidence. 
And having· heard the arg·ument of counsel, the Court sus-
tained said motion and set aside the verdict. of the jury, and 
awarded the defendant a new trial. 
Teste: Thi~ 31st day of March, 1941. 
0. L. SHACKLEFORD (Seal) 
Judge 
I 
j 
. ) 
I 
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I, 0. L. Shackleford, Judge of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, who presided over the 
foregoing trial of Lillian ,Stubbs 1J. Frances Cowden, in said 
Court at Norfolk, Virginia, do certify that the original ex-
hibits introduced in evidence a.s mentioned in the Certificate 
of Exception No. 1, and the affidavits hereinafter mentioned, 
which exhibits have been initialed by me for the purpose of 
identification are, by stipulation between plaintiff and de-
fendant, transmitted to the Supreme Court of Appeals as a 
part qf the record in this case in lieu of presenting to the 
Cour.t copies of said exhibits. I further certify that def end-
ant's exhibits numbered 9, 10, and 11, consisting of affidavits 
made by Stephen Cutrell, .J. W. Bennett and Frances Cowden, 
respectively, were submitted to the Court by the defendant 
while the defendant's motion for a new trial was pending, 
at which time, the defendant moved that a new trial be 
granted on the further ground of newly discovered evidence 
and offered· said affidavits in support of said motion. 
And I further certifv that the attornev for the defendant 
had reasonable notice,· in writing, given"' by counsel for the 
plaintiff, of the time and place when the foregoing Certifi-
cates of Exception, ex}Jibits, and other incidents of trial, 
would be tendered and presented to me to be signed, authenti-
catetl and verified. 
page 31 ~ Given under my hand this 31st day of March, 
1941, within sbdy (60) days of the entry of the 
final judgment in said case. 
Virg-inia: 
0. L. SHA.OKLEFORD, 
,Tudge of the ·Comt of Law and Chancery 
of the City of Norfolk, Virginia. 
In the Clerk's Office of the Court of Law and Chancerv of 
the City of Norfolk. · 
I, W. L. Prieur, ,Jr., Clerk of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the ,City of Norfolk, do hereby certify tlmt the fore-
going and annexed is a true transcript of the recol'd in the 
suit of Lillian Stubbs, plaintiff, v. FTances Cowden, defendant, 
lately pending in said Court. 
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I further certify that the said copy was not made up and 
completed until the defendant 'had bad due- notice of the mak-
ing of the same and the intention of the plaintiff to take an 
appeal therein. 
Given· under my band this 2d day of .April, 1941. 
W. L. PRIElfR., JR., Clerk. 
Fee for this recol'Cl $24.50. 
A Copy-Teste: 
: M. B. WATTS, C. · C. 
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